The case featured in this issue discusses Zambia's agricultural development particularly in the context of the new economic environment. Zambia is unique compared to most developing countries in that its share of agriculture in national income is less than 20 per cent while its share of work-force is over 80 per cent. Even the percentage of people living in absolute poverty is high. Also/ labour in general is underutilized and 75 per cent of agricultural labour compose of women. Thus/ according to Bhupat Desai and Namboodiri/ there is a compelling case for developing agriculture.
Zambia is unique compared to most developing countries in respect of agriculture's share in national income vis -a-vis its work-force. The former is less than 20 per cent, while the latter is over 80 per cent. Even the percentage of people living in poverty (absolute poverty) is very high, it being 86 per cent of 8.78 million population in early 1990s. Moreover, 75 per cent of agricultural labour supply is from women and labour in general is highly underutilized. Thus, there is a compelling case for developing agriculture.
Profile of Agriculture
In 1994, the agricultural sector in Zambia contributed 18 per cent to GDP, employed about 83 per cent of work-force, and earned about 2 per cent of total exports. Zambia has only one rainy season. The average annual rainfall varies across regions -650 mm in more arid areas to 1800 mm in the most humid areas. Rainfall is highly variable within and between years. But, the country is wellendowed with rivers, lakes, and groundwater supplies. Yet, agriculture is largely rainfed; irrigated farming being only 3.36 per cent (i.e. 46000 hectare) of cultivated land of 1.37 million hectare. However, 40 per cent of cultivated land can be brought under irrigation.
Land is the most abundant resource with high potential though it varies across regions. Out of 74.34 million hectare of land, over 47 per cent is agricultural and 5.26 million hectare is currently under crop and milk production.
Three different agro-ecological zones identified are: Zone I mainly covering Luangwa and Zambezi Valleys in the west with 42 per cent of total land having short growing season of 80 to 120 days; Zone II covering the central, southern, and eastern plateau with 12 per cent of total land that has a long growing season of 100 to 140 days; and Zone III constituting 46 per cent of the land and consisting of Copper-belt, Luapula, northern and north-western provinces with longer growing season of 120 to 150 days. Zone II
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is most fertile, while parts of Zone I are least fertile. Exhibit 1 gives some characteristics of various zones.
The country is divided into nine provinces which are further sub-divided into 63 districts with 10 blocks each which is the ultimate unit of managing agricultural services like research, extension, etc.
It is estimated that 73 per cent of farmers are smallscale (up to 20 hectare) with an average farm size of about 2 hectare. They operate about 21 per cent of land (Exhibit 2). These farmers grow maize (50% share), sorghum, millet, and cassava (with >40%), pulses, groundnut , and rice. Most crops are grown as a mixed stand for selfconsumption with only occasional marketable surplus. They are mainly located in region III. They use few improved inputs and hold land under traditional law.
Another category of small-scale farmers known as emergent commercial farmers (up to 20 hectare) constitute 22 per cent and operate about 50 per cent of land with an average farm size of 15 hectare (Exhibit 2). They are largely found in region II. They use some improved inputs such as composite seed, fertilizer, and ox ploughs, and hold land under traditional tenure though a few have land title deeds. They mainly grow maize but other crops such as sunflower, wheat (irrigated), cotton, groundnut, and some pulses are also grown by them. They generate substantial marketable surplus especially of maize and oilseeds.
Medium-scale farmers (20 to 60 hectare) constitute about 5 per cent and cultivate 28 per cent of land with an average farm size of about 41 hectare (Exhibit 2). A majority of these farmers are in region II and hold land under traditional tenure. They mainly grow maize, sunflower, wheat (irrigated), cotton, groundnut, and some pulses with some improved varieties, irrigation, fertilizers, draught animal power, and tractor hire. They market most of their production. Asian experience with such technology suggests that it is also scale-neutral and divisible and enables increasing agricultural production at reduced unit costs/prices in real terms (Desai and Namboodiri, 1997) .
Over 90 per cent of cultivated area is under food crops (see last column in Exhibit 3). Maize being a staple food accounts for 47 per cent of total cropped area. Vegetables account for about 19 per cent, and cassava and roots and tubers about 8 per cent each (Exhibit 3).
Between 1963 and 1991-93, the crop pattern shifted from sorghum, millet, pulses, and groundnut to maize, wheat, rice, cassava, roots and tubers, cotton, sugarcane, vegetables, and sunflower (Exhibit 3). Part of this shift has come from increase in area under cultivation (i.e., extensive farming as well as to some extent perhaps intensive cultivation). These shifts in crop pattern have by and large continued after sustained reforms got initiated in 1987.
Agricultural Performance Long Run Trends and

Sources of Growth
During 1963-93, growth in production of major food crops except roots and tubers, cassava, wheat, and rice was lower than the population growth rate of about 3.2 per cent per year. Annual growth rate in production of maize, roots and tubers, cassava, seed cotton, sugarcane, wheat, rice, and vegetables increased during this period, while that of millet, sorghum, pulses, groundnut, and sunflower declined (Exhibit 4).
For most of the crops, growth in area was the main source of growth in production. Moreover, yield growth rate was negative for maize, millet, sorghum, groundnut, seed cotton, sunflower, and even sugarcane (Exhibit 4). The former seems natural for a country with large reserve of cultivable land (45.3 million hectare) and the latter suggests that technical change in agriculture does not seem to be a broad-based and main -stream strategy. This is also evident from the following:
• Limited development of irrigation potential.
• Lowe r growth in fertilizer use and its per hectare application (Exhibit 5).
• Lower allocation of government expenditure on agriculture and for its technological and economic resources as will be shown later for some recent period.
• ack of acceleration in both yield and production for all crops except roots and tubers, cassava, and pulses which are traditionally grown and are drought-resistant (Exhibit 6).
Short Run Trends and Sources of Growth
In the post-reform seven years, agricultural performance deteriorated. This is suggested by the following findings:
• Annual compound growth rate in production of major food crops except millet, roots and tubers, cassava, pulses, and groundnut was lower than in the seven years preceding reforms (Exhibit 7).
• In almost all these exceptional crops, yield as a source of growth which was more important prior to reforms turned less important compared to area as a source of growth (Exhibit 7).
• The shift in the source of growth for production from yield to area also holds for such other important crops as maize, sugarcane, rice, and sunflower (Exhibit 7).
• Lack of acceleration in the growth of both yield and production of crops that dominate its pattern got pronounced after the reforms emerged (Exhibit 6).
• Annual compound growth rate of milk and fish production also declined though that of egg and meat production have improved significantly (Exhibit 8).
• Growth rate in gross value added 2 (i.e. GDP) from agriculture in 1987 prices also declined significantly from 7.36 per cent per annum during 1981-86 to 2.15 per cent per annum during 1987-91.
Factors for Agricultural Growth
Three types of factors conductive for agriculturual growth are economic, institutional, and technological. These not only overlap but even interact and yet they are separately discussed for analytical convenience.
Economic factors mainly include prices, subsidies and taxes, and government expenditure. Institutional factors are land tenure, marketing agencies, and rural financial institutions. And technological factors mainly include agricultural research, extension, and supply 'This is defined as value of agricultural production minus intermediate inputs such as seeds, manure, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. which get exhausted in the production process. And it represents returns to four factors of production, namely, land, labour, capital, and entrepreneurship. of (market purchased) farm inputs such as seeds, feeds, fertilizers, farm implements and machinery, veterinary services and medicines, etc. Each of these three factors is briefly discussed by considering the change in policy thrusts under the new economic environment.
Economic Factors
In the wake of macro reforms, prices of agricultural commodities have been decontrolled except for the floor price for maize. Similar is the case for market purchased farm inputs (like fertilizers). In addition, trade in both of these is liberalized. These forces are expected to improve agriculture's barter terms of trade (i.e. prices received to prices paid by farmers) which in turn would result in better sectoral growth even though farm input subsidies are withdrawn.
The question is whether there has been any improvement. Unfortunately, more complete data on relative farm prices are not available and hence, we utilize crop-wise farmers' prices relative to prices of various fertilizers (Exhibit 9).
A comparison of Exhibits 7 and 9 suggests a weak relation between production performance and the output to fertilizer price ratio. Thus, despite improvement in relative price in the post-reform period for cotton, sunflower, and sorghum their growth performance deteriorated. Furthermore, despite the deterioration in crop to fertilizer price ratio for groundnut and millet, their growth performance improved. The only crop for which there seems to be some association between this relative price and growth performance is maize 3 .
The preceding findings reinforce the viewpoint that price reforms in sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to stimulate major agricultural growth (Lipton, 1987) . According to an IMF survey of nine African countries, the agricultural supply in the short run increases by a mere 0.18 per cent for every 1 per cent increase in relative farm prices. The corresponding long run response is also only 0.21 per cent (Bond, 1983) . Such closely comparable short and long run supply elasticities suggest that the farmers' speed of adjustment to institutional rigidities and market imperfections is very high.
However, several reasons may be responsible for the low magnitude of aggregate supply elasticities.
Significant ones are inadequacies of input distribution system and poor state of agricultural infrastructure in general, besides the inadequacy of existing technologies for semi -arid and humid areas and resource specificity in agriculture (Mellor and Christopher, 1984, and Leie, 1984) . But, responsiveness of total farm output to additional government expenditure (on agriculture) is much higher (Cleaver, 1985) . The only caveat is that the composition of this expenditure is very critical for this response. This brings us to analyse both the level and pattern of government expenditure on agriculture. Before these are discussed, it may be noted that the size of the government is being reduced by dismantling the parastatles that were ubiquitous in agricultural commodity marketing and processing except for the strategic reserves of cereals (mainly maize) for social safety net (Exhibit 10, rows III.l to IV.2).
Despite potency of government expenditure as an instrument for agricultural development, it has declined in post-reform period. This is so for its level, rate of growth as well as per cent share in total expenditure in real terms (Exhibit 11). This may be a result of astronomically high inflation and containing fiscal deficit in the wake of economic re forms. What is further disturbing is that the government expenditure on agriculture in relative terms (i.e. as a per cent of expenditure on all sectors) declined significantly from 11 per cent to about 4 per cent. The pattern of this expenditure given in Exhibit 12 reveals that it shifted from economic to technological and institutional factors. The relative (i.e.%) decline in government expenditure on marketing and cooperatives is consistent with the policy of privatization of (agricultural commodity) parastatles mentioned earlier. But, the relative shift in favour of technological factors is particularly interesting; this relative share in post-reform period was over 62 per cent compared to about 52 per cent prior to reforms (Exhibit 12). Even as a per cent of agricultural GDP, the government expenditure on R&D increased from 0.22 per cent in 1986 to 0.27 per cent in 1991. However, both are way below the 2 per cent norm internationally recommended.
Institutional Factors
Traditionally, the dual system for land ownership existed. One, about 94 per cent of land was subject to customary communal usage rights. Community Chiefs were the custodian of this land known as Trust Land. And two, the remaining 6 per cent was state land most of which was made available to individuals and companies through various forms of 99 years leasehold. Currently, all land is under the President
and farmers have open-ended lease which is granted through consultation with the Chiefs.
Long-term land reforms aim at converting customary communal usage rights to leasehold through a decentralized programme of land registration and transfer. This should lead to issuance of land title deeds and regulation of land transfers.
Marketing of most farm commodities was a monopoly of public agencies such as government parastatles and cooperatives. As noted earlier, these are being privatized and the private sector is encouraged to enter the commodity market. The only exception is for the reserves of food such as maize, sorghum, and soybean. Even for this, buying centres are established where food purchase agents buy from the farmers at a price that they determine rather than the government. From the limited experience so far, apparently, there is a problem regarding appropriate price that the farmers receive though this has solved the problem of delayed payments that was rampant earlier.
On agricultural credit, both interest rate and institutional reforms have been introduced. Interest rates are fully deregulated and are uniform across sectors. These have resulted into very high interest rates in the range of 60 to 80 per cent despite a fall in inflation of about 35 to 40 per cent. On institutional development, the government has a revolving fund to implement fertilizer business on credit through national credit managers which on lend to private fertilizer dealers acting as credit coordinators to further on lend to the farmers. Limited experience with this institutional innovation seems mixed mainly due to indiscipline in the system and severe drought of 1992.
The three vertically integrated rural financial institutions of pre-reform era, namely, LIMA Bank, Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), and Credit Union and Savings Association (CUSA) which were all government sponsored have now discontinued financial support. This was done as these institutions had high loan delinquency, poor management and financial accounting system, and high administrative costs in relation to interest rates. But, these institutions did not have legal access to take recalcitrant borrowers to the court in addition to being politicized. Agricultural credit disbursement in real terms in 1980s has substantially declined, besides smaller farmers' access to formal credit being poor.
Technological Factors
Technological factors include two aspects which are agricultural R&D and supply of inputs and services in which new technology is usually embodied.
Agricultural research and extension (R&D) services are organized by the government and are spread throughout the country. There are four research centres and 17 research stations. The extension worker to farmers ratio is 1:600. While plans are afoot to improve this ratio, both research and extension services for crops like cotton, tobacco, arid sugarcane are being privatized (Exhibit 10). Prior to mid -1970s, maize research and extension by the government was prioritized. Since then, this has been gradually diversified for such other crops as wheat, soybean, sunflower, and sugarcane mainly to reduce larger allocation of area under maize. But, crops like millet, sorghum, and pulses are neglected.
In the wake of reforms, evolution and transfer of new technology for both crops and livestock suitable to three agro-ecological zones and drought conditions are emphasized. User charges for livestock services which were earlier free have been introduced. Similarly, agricultural education and training were offered free earlier but are charged now. However, user charges for extension services are not levied.
Until the macro reforms got accelerated in early 1990s, seed industry was in the government sector. Since then it is liberalized by permitting imports of seeds such as for groundnut and entry of private multinationals (Exhibit 10). Similarly, seed certification has been made mandatory. Both these factors are expected to improve supply of seeds and its quality. But the demand for most new varieties except maize is low perhaps due to inadequate extension services and density of input distribution channels of cooperatives and private dealers.
Until recently, there were government plants for manufacturing fertilizers, pesticides, and cattlefeed. These plants are being privatized due to their poor performance (Exhibit 10). Import controls on these new inputs were common to develop domestic farm input industries. But, fertilizer imports is now liberalized. Three-fourth of the fertilizers is imported, though some fertilizers are also received in foreign aid. Similar dependency on external sources also exists for farm equipment and machinery.
Regarding d evelopment of irrigation, though the government has played some role in the past especially for wheat and sugarcane and water for livestock, greater reliance on privatization for small projects in particular is being planned (Exhibit 10).
The preceding discussion reveals that there is some decentralized network of agricultural R&D but the same did not exist for the inputs in which new technology is embodied. With the entry of private sector, perhaps, the latter may improve especially for seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and cattlefeed.
To conclude, the unusually disproportionate share of agriculture in national income vis -a-vis work-force is an outcome of Zambia's over-dependence on the mining industry (i.e. copper) and frittering away the benefits it had from the boom experienced in its early years. In recent years, though the need for developing agriculture has been recognized, the government support for accomplishing this has got reduced. This may be because of greater reliance of macro reforms on markets and privatization. But, neither the pre-reform regime nor this reliance has so far succeeded in making agricultural growth broad-based and technologydriven. While the government is acutely aware that future economic growth and poverty alleviation are clearly dependent on agriculture it does not seem to be able to respond adequately despite formulating more appropriate public investment programme in 1994 that has prioritized technological and economic resources for agriculture. (Exhibit 13). This may be because Zambia is caught in external debt trap.
Questions for Discussion
1. Are the objectives of agricultural growth and alleviation of absolute poverty compatible? Why or why not?
2. Considering the relationship between agricultural production and its inputs, how does the strategy of "extensive farming" differ from that of "technical change" in agriculture?
3. Is improving relative prices for agriculture (i.e., barter terms of trade) through price reforms a "strategy" or "instrument" of agricultural policy?
4. Delineate "positive" and "not-so-positive" initiatives in agricultural policies uder the macroeconomic reforms. And, identify better alternatives, if any, for the latter. where t' = t -t + 1 and growth rate is given by b+2c. __^_ Except for sugarcane for which 1975-77 is considered and for wheat and rice for which 1979-81 is considered due to non-availability of data for earlier years. where t' = t -n +1 in which n is number of year •s. If the coefficient c is statistically significantly positive, then it suggests an acceleration, while if it is negative it Indicates deceleration. * Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% " w Significant at 10% Community, Private and Some State Farms which are being Privatized ------do -----
Exhibit 1: Characteristics of Agro-ecological Zones
[1] These sub-systems are agricultural production (APS), agri-inputs (AIS), and agro-marketing and processing (AMPS). APS has a backward linkage with AIS and forward linkage with AMPS. The former linkage is critical for rapid technical change in agriculture, while the latter is critical for assured marketing and prices.
[2] There is on an average one extension worker for 600 farmers. [4] This includes National Milling Co., Mulungashi Investments, and Indeco Milling, etc.
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